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Abstract
The occupational skill structure depends on the business cycle if employers re-
spond to shortages of applicants during upturns by lowering their hiring standards.
The notion and relevance of hiring standards adjustment was advanced by Reder
(1955) and investigated formally in a search-theoretic framework by Mortensen
(1970). Devereux (2002) implements empirical tests for these theories and finds
affirmative evidence for the U.S labour market. We replicate his analysis using
German employment register data. Regarding the occupational skill composition
we obtain somewhat lower but qualitatively similar responses to the business cycle
despite of well known institutional differences between the U.S. and German labour
market. The responsiveness of occupational composition wages to the business
cycle is considerably lower in Germany.
Die berufliche Qualifikationsstruktur ist konjunkturabhängig, wenn Arbeitgeber ein
zu geringes Angebot von Arbeitskräften mit einer Senkung der Einstellungs- und
Qualifikationsstandards beantworten. Die Bedeutung von Einstellungsstandards
für Anpassungsprozesse auf dem Arbeitsmarkt wurde von Reder (1955) in die
theoretische Diskussion eingeführt und von Mortensen (1970) formal im Rahmen
eines suchtheoretischen Modellrahmens untersucht. Devereux (2002) implemen-
tiert empirische Tests für diese Theorien und findet mit U.S.-Daten Evidenz für
diese Modelle. Wir replizieren seine Analyse mit deutschen Registerdaten. Trotz
der institutionellen Unterschiede zwischen beiden Ländern, finden wir in Bezug auf
die berufliche Qualifikation für Deutschland etwas geringere, aber qualitativ sehr
ähnliche Effekte der Konjunktur.
JEL classification: J62, J31, J41, C24
Keywords: Hiring standards, business cycle adjustment, occupational upgrading,
wage structure, wage setting, overqualification.
Acknowledgements: We thank Ekkehart Schlicht, Stefan Bender, Florian Hoff-
mann, Katja Wolf, Anette Haas, Katja Görlitz and Uwe Blien for helpful conversa-
tions and comments. Of course, all remaining errors are ours.
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1 Introduction
The delight caused by the 2006/2007 upturn of the German business cycle was
soon followed by concerns about a threatening shortage of skilled labour (in Ger-
man: ‘Fachkraeftemangel’). Since unemployment rates remained at significant lev-
els, one was tempted to perceive these concerns as pure exaggeration. A closer
look at the composition of the unemployment pool suggests, however, that it may
indeed be difficult to fill open slots with formerly unemployed workers because they
often lack the required skills or experience. The related question whether and to
which extent employers respond to skill shortages by upgrading less skilled work-
ers (or to labour supply surplus by downgrading skilled workers) is interesting both
from a political and theoretical point of view.
Regarding the political aspect it is interesting to see whether employers really filled
open slots with under-qualified workers in the upturns of the last decades, whether
the implied change of hiring standards has a noteworthy effect on the empirical skill
composition within occupations and whether past upturns provided entries to stable
employment relations for low educated workers. The change of skill requirements
over the business cycle would explain why unskilled workers are affected more by
recessions than skilled workers. If the unskilled are crowded out by the skilled,
active labour market policy should not be focused on the unskilled but be directed
towards skilled workers to eliminate the primary cause of the crowding out.1
Regarding theory, the results of our investigation sheds light on the question whether
market clearing takes place mainly through wage adjustment (as assumed in pure
neoclassical theory) or through a combination of wage and hiring standards adjust-
ment. The notion of hiring standards adjustment goes back to Reder (1955) who
develops a theory of occupational wage differentials based on the idea that “... em-
ployers tend to lower the minimum standards on which they insist as a condition
for hiring a worker when applicants become scarce.” Although the difference be-
tween wage and quality adjustment appears to be innocuous at first glance, wage
adjustment is compatible with standard neoclassical wage competition whereas
quality adjustment may generate efficiency wage problems (see Thurow (1975)
and Schlicht (2005) for expositions of the argument and Bewley (1999) for sur-
vey evidence). Mortensen (1970) shows (in the framework of matching theories)
that firms may combine wage and hiring standards adjustment even if wages are
flexible.
If employers respond to labour shortage during upturns by lowering their hiring
standards instead of bidding up wages, the average skill level within occupations
should decrease. Therefore an empirically testable implication of Reder’s theory
1 Cf. Devereux (2002), p. 425.
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is that the average skill level for occupations should be counter-cyclical. Devereux
(2002) implements a test using the identifying assumption that (at least in the short
run) jobs in the same occupation are characterised by identical skill requirements.
He selects new hires (job starters and movers between firms) from the CPS data
and forms occupation-year cells. The test is conducted by computing proportions of
skilled employees for each cell and regressing them on the national unemployment
rate and a rich set of control variables. A positive coefficient of the unemployment
rate indicates counter-cyclicality of the new hires’ skill levels. Devereux finds the
theory confirmed for the U.S. data.2 As a further implication of Reder’s theory, the
responsiveness of mean qualification should be more pronounced for lower-paying
occupations. Devereux tests this by ranking occupations with respect to average
wages, partitioning the sample into five quintiles, and running the regressions sep-
arately for every quintile. The results are again affirmative but the evidence is less
clear and the outcomes depend on the definition of the average skill measure.
A second implication of Reder’s theory is that the occupational composition of em-
ployment should change systematically over the business cycle. If employers re-
spond to labour shortage during upturns by lowering their hiring standards instead
of bidding up wages, they create possibilities for employees to improve their wages
by occupational upgrading, i.e. by moving from low wage occupations to more
highly paid ones. The converse (downgrading) should be observed during down-
turns. Devereux (2002) implements a test by selecting a sample of job changes,
computing a measure of occupational quality and regressing it on the unemploy-
ment rate and control variables. He finds that employees are likely to move to
higher-paying jobs if the unemployment rate is falling, i.e. the occupational compo-
sition wage is procyclical in the U.S.
We replicate Devereux’s analysis on skill shares and on occupational upgrading
using employment register data from the German Federal Employment Agency
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit) which comprise detailed wage and demographic vari-
ables for all dependent employees covered by the social security system (about 80
percent of the work force). Particular advantages of our data are their huge size
(about 20 to 25 million workers per year for West Germany) and the long time pe-
riod covered (1980-2004). We use similar estimation methods but have to account
for small differences in the data such as censored wages. The similarity of the data
and the estimation approach render us with estimation results we regard as directly
comparable to the US results.
In spite of the often emphasized differences between the U.S. and German labour
markets, we find noteworthy similarities in the cyclicality of the occupational skill
2 A related analysis on crowding out of unskilled workers in the business cycle is presented in
Pollmann-Schult (2005). It is, however, not informative regarding Reder’s theory because it does
not control for cyclical between-occupation shifts.
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composition for both countries. The responses for West Germany amount to about
70 percent of the U.S. values. The analysis of occupational wage upgrading yields
a similar result. We find that the occupational composition wage is procyclical, but
in Germany the responsiveness is substantially lower than in the U.S. At first glance
these similarities are surprising because the labour markets in both countries are
characterized by quite different institutional frameworks. The most striking differ-
ences relate to 1) the wage bargaining system, 2) the occupational training system
and 3) the role of the government with regard to regulations such as job protection
laws.3
A closer inspection of the impact of these institutions on the occupational skill com-
position reveals countervailing forces. To see the implications of a tight wage bar-
gaining system and wage rigidities consider an economy hit by a positive product
demand shock. For a homogenous production function (which should be a good
approximation to reality) we expect equal increases in the demand for all factors of
production, hence equal increases for skilled and unskilled workers. Firms would
bid up wages in their recruitment efforts for all skill groups. Relative employment
of the skill groups should remain (almost) unchanged as long as the supply elas-
ticities of skilled and unskilled workers do not differ too much. If firms lower hiring
standards instead of bidding up wages, relative employment of the unskilled will
increase. Thus, we expect wage rigidities to increase the responsiveness of skill
proportions to the business cycle, which implies that effects should be greater for
Germany. More generous unemployment benefits act in the same direction by
generating a de-facto time-invariant minimum wage affecting mainly the unskilled.
Regarding occupational upgrading the same logic suggests that effects may even
be more pronounced in Germany. Dependence of occupational upgrading on the
business cycle is based, however, on at least two requirements: Employers must
vary hiring standards in response to the business cycle and wage differentials be-
tween occupations must be noncompetitive. The second condition is necessary
since employees had no incentive to move to more highly paid occupations if the
associated wage gain compensates only for more unpleasant working conditions
or additional risks (as in the case of compensating wage differentials).
Thus the less pronounced responses found in the German data should rather be
caused by a less permeable occupational system in Germany. This is confirmed
by a closer look at the institutional conditions: Whereas occupational training in the
U.S. is almost completely in the responsibility of the employer, vocational training
is well-structured, strictly regulated and standardized in Germany. Training lasts
3 As the differences between Germany and the U.S. are stressed frequently and explained in
detail in the literature, we outline only the most important details. See Franz & Soskice (1995)
or Harhoff & Kane (1997) for international comparisons of the occupational training system, and
Soskice (1990) for a survey on the wage bargaining systems.
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between two and three years in the so-called ‘dual system’ and takes place in firms
(about 3-4 days per week) and vocational schools (1-2 days per week). Gener-
alized curricula which are binding for (specialized) vocational schools as well as
for employers are defined by national committees and monitored by the chambers
of commerce and industry. The training ends with standardized theoretical and
practical examinations. Its paramount importance for the German labour market is
due to the fact that the entry to many jobs in industry and trade de-facto requires a
certificate of completed apprenticeship and remuneration in most collective wage
agreements is linked to vocational qualification.4 Because of the importance of vo-
cational degrees we expect low and medium skilled workers to be less substitutable
in Germany which is why we expect less pronounced responses of the occupational
skill composition to the business cycle in West Germany. Finally, responsiveness
should be lower also due to job protection laws. They increase firing costs and the
risks associated with bad matches between unskilled workers and complex tasks
and thus make it less profitable to recruit unskilled workers for skilled jobs during
upturns. To summarize: While wage rigidities and generous unemployment ben-
efits strengthen the reaction of skill proportions to the business cycle, institutional
rigidities should lower it. Note however, that the presence of institutional rigidities
in Germany does not necessarily imply inefficiencies since they may be associated
with more pronounced incentives to acquire occupation- or firm-specific human
capital.
We conduct a test of the occupational rigidities hypothesis by restricting the sam-
ple for the skill proportions model to recognized occupations. The rationale for the
test is that skill proportions responses should be significantly lower for this sub-
sample if the occupational system restricts access of the unskilled to certain jobs.
The hypothesis is, however, rejected by this test as the the coefficients are almost
identical to the full sample. An alternative explanation for the differences between
Germany and the U.S. relates to differences in the firm structure. Separate skill
proportions regressions show that business cycle effects are considerably smaller
for small establishments. According to this outcome, skill proportions may be less
responsive in Germany simply because of the larger share of employees in small
firms.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we provide a description
of our data, explain data selection and processing steps and discuss differences
to Devereux’s data. Section 3 is on our analysis of skill proportions and Section 4
on occupational wages. Both sections start with a description of the econometric
model which is followed by the estimation results. We conclude with a summary.
4 Additionally, many craft trades may be practised only by or under the supervision of a master
craftsmen.
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2 Data
Our analysis is based on the employment register of the German Federal Employ-
ment Agency that includes information of daily accuracy on all employees liable to
social security in Germany. These register data stem from the employers’ periodic
notifications which are the basis for the calculation of individual social security con-
tributions and social security claims such as unemployment benefits or pensions.
We choose all observations for the years 1980 to 2004 and create cross-sections
for the reference date June 30. As our definition of new hires relies on information
from the year before we are able to analyse 24 years from 1981 to 2004. The sam-
ple is restricted to employees who work in West Germany for two reasons. First,
information for East Germany is not available before 1993. Second, the educa-
tional and vocational system in the former communist state differed considerably
from the West German. More important, productivity of East German workers may
have been lower in the past as they were trained and worked with different and
outdated equipment in the communist economy. We keep full-time workers aged
between 20 and 60 years and exclude apprentices. Marginal employees who are
not liable to social security contributions because their wage is below a certain
threshold are dropped because they are not included in the employment register
until 1999. For employees with more than one job we keep the job with the highest
wage which we consider the main job.
All employees who did not work in the same establishment on June 30 of the year
before are considered new hires. They either come from the education system,
from unemployment or from jobs in other establishments. Establishments are iden-
tified by the establishment id that is assigned to every establishment by the local
employment agency.5
In our analysis of occupation wages in Section 4 we have to observe the wage
before the entry into the new firm. Therefore the sample is restricted to all estab-
lishment movers who were employed for at least two months in the current year
and the year before. Since 1984 bonus payments are included in wage records but
cannot be identified. That is why we further exclude the years before 1984 from the
wage estimation sample. Besides the information on earnings that is necessary to
calculate the social security contributions, the employment register includes some
basic characteristics of the employee also filled in by the employer. These are gen-
der, educational degree, nationality, education, and occupation. This information is
not relevant to social security contributions and claims. Employers misreporting on
these items are not sanctioned. Nevertheless high response rates and consistency
checks in general indicate a good data quality. One reservation applies, however,
5 In rare cases the establishment id changes although the establishment stays the same, e.g. if
the owner changes. In general the identification of new hires can be considered as very reliable.
IAB-Discussion Paper 02/2009 9
for our education variable. It is a mixture of schooling and vocational degree with 6
categories:
Lower/intermediate secondary school leaving certificate
1 without completed vocational training
2 with completed vocational training (completed apprenticeship or
semi-skilled training, completion of a specialized vocational school)
Upper secondary school leaving certificate (general or subject-specific ap-
titude for higher education)
3 without completed vocational training
4 with completed vocational training (completed apprenticeship or
semi-skilled training, completion of a specialized vocational school)
5 Technical college degree (formerly: advanced technical school)
6 College/university degree
Consistency checks of the education variable suggest that employers sometimes
seem to infer the education level from the task performed by the employee. For
example, they report a vocational degree for an unskilled employee if he is assigned
to a task requiring a vocational degree. Inspection of individual worker biographies
indicates that this occurs mainly for unskilled workers.6 This implies that estimates
of the occupational skill responsiveness are biased towards zero.
The qualification proportions are listed in Table 1. We group the education levels
into three categories: low is without vocational degree (1 and 3), medium is with
vocational degree (2 and 4), and high is with college or university degree (5 and
6). In the analysis of changing hiring standards workers with missing education
information are dropped, in the wage analysis they are included and assigned to
a fourth ‘dummy’ skill group. In analogy to Devereux (2002) our skill proportions
analysis is based on the proportions of (a) high-skilled workers and (b) qualified
workers (medium- and high-skilled) for each cell. The comparability of group (a) to
U.S. college graduates is beyond dispute. Things are less clear regarding group
(b). We think it can be considered comparable to employees with at least a high
school diploma in the U.S. as “Apprentices in Germany occupy a similar position
within the German wage structure as held by high school graduates in the U.S.
labour market” (Harhoff & Kane (1997)). Over all years on average 7.6 percent of
the new hires are high skilled, 80 percent are qualified.
The occupational classification used in the employment register lists 331 occupa-
tions. We drop the occupations home-care nurses and household helpers as they
are not included in all years. We further drop medical professions, pharmacists,
6 One way to check the consistency of the education variable is to select all employees reported to
have completed vocational training. Since the register data date back to 1975 we should observe
vocational training spells at least for all selected workers who were born after 1960.
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lawyers and architects because the frequencies of these professions change im-
plausibly, especially in 1998. Our final sample includes 324 occupations.7
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of our two samples for 1984 and 2004.8 The
full sample column regards all employees liable to social security in West Germany
who work full-time and are aged between 20 and 60. In 1984 14.98 mill. obser-
vations in the full sample amount 74.4 percent of all employees liable to social
security, in 2004 14.85 mill. observations amount to 70.0 percent. The decline of
the share is mainly due to the rise in part-time employment. The skill composition
sample contains new hires with valid information on the education variable. The
wage sample contains new hires with wage information on the year before. There-
fore these samples overlap but they are not nested. The share of observations in
the skill composition sample falls from 13.9 to 12.1 percent which is in part due to
a rise of missing values in the education variable. The share of observations in the
wage sample rises from 6.7 to 8.0 percent.
7 As a robustness check we repeated the analysis with the occupations aggregated to 82 occupa-
tional groups on the two-digit-level. The results are not included here because deviations from
the reported effects are small. They can be obtained from the authors on request.
8 We selected these years for descriptives because the skill composition analysis includes the
years 1981 to 2004 and the wage analysis the years 1984 to 2004. So these years are the first
and the last year of the overlapping period.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Full sample New hires
Skill composition Wage
regressions regressions
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1984
Age 37.91 11.27 32.31 10.56 33.82 10.58
Female 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.29 0.46
Low/intermed. school 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38
Vocational training 0.66 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.68 0.47
Upper school 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.07
Upper school
and vocational training 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13
Technical college 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14
University degree 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.15
Education missing 0.05 0.23 - - 0.08 0.27
Daily wage 63.62* 22.43 54.50* 21.35 61.06* 22.02
Observations 14,980,342 2,083,308 1,011,006
2004
Age 39.55 9.97 35.68 10.19 37.43 9.73
Female 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46
Low/intermed. school 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37 0.10 0.29
Vocational training 0.61 0.49 0.65 0.48 0.56 0.50
Upper school 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.08
Upper school
and vocational training 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
Technical college 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20
University degree 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24
Education missing 0.12 0.33 - - 0.18 0.39
Daily wage 76.97* 33.80 66.22* 34.45 74.39* 34.13
Observations 14,848,781 1,803,104 1,182,873
Skill composition regressions include the years 1981 to 2004, wage regressions the years 1984 to
2004.
*) Median instead of mean due to the upper censoring of wages (wages are in Euro and deflated
with base year 1995).
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As can be expected new hires are younger on average than all full time employees.
New hires in the skill composition sample are even younger than those in the wage
sample. Average age is considerably higher in 2004 than in 1984. Compared to
the full sample the proportion of women is higher in the skill composition sample
but lower in the wage sample in both years. The education level is rising over time
but shows only small differences between the samples. In agreement with the age
pattern the median wage is lower for new hires and lowest in the skill composition
sample. The unemployment rate for West Germany in the years 1981 to 2004 is
taken from the official employment statistics of the German Federal Employment
Agency (BA-Statistik).
There are some minor differences between our and Devereux’s data and defini-
tions. First, we define prime age 20 to 60, Devereux 18 to 64. The upper limit
is decreased in our study to 60 to avoid bias due to early retirement practices in
Germany. Second, we identify new hires using establishment ids, Devereux uses
job descriptions or industries. And third, Devereux’s occupational classification
scheme seems to be slightly finer than ours.9 In general the samples can be con-
sidered very similar so that differences in results can be attributed to institutional
differences between the U.S. and Germany.
3 Explaining the occupational skill composition
As the main intention of our paper is to compare the U.S. and German labour mar-
kets, our estimation procedures follow Devereux (2002) closely. Minor variations
are introduced because our data allow for additional checks and extensions or urge
us to minor changes because of the censoring of wages.
3.1 Empirical model
To investigate the cyclicality of the occupational skill composition, Devereux (2002)
runs regressions of the proportion of qualified workers in occupation-year cells ot
on the unemployment rate Ut, a quadratic trend and fixed occupation effects γo:
sot = β0 + β1 Ut + β2 t+ β3 t
2 + γo + vt + ²ot (1)
²ot denotes a white noise residual and vt an unobservable time shock.10 Direct
estimation of this model using the standard OLS coefficient variance formula would
9 As reported above, we use 324 different occupations. Devereux does not report this number. It
can, however be inferred from the cell numbers given in his Table 2b. He uses 6508 occupation-
year cells for 17 years. A balanced panel with 383 occupations and 17 years would amount to
6511 cells (some cells may be empty in some years.)
10 Note that vt cannot be estimated because of the dimension of Ut.
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yield severely biased standard errors because Ut is constant for all cells within a
year.11 This problem can be solved either by computing the covariance matrix in a
way that allows for clustering by year or by the application of a two-step procedure.
In the first step the shares are regressed on occupation and time dummies:
sot = δ γo +
T∑
t=1
φtDt + ²ot (2)
Each occupation-year cell is weighted by its number of individuals. In the sec-
ond step the time dummy coefficients (which can be interpreted as composition-
corrected proportions) are regressed on a quadratic trend and the unemployment
rate.
φˆt = α1 + α2 Ut + α3 t+ α4 t
2 + νt (3)
Again each observation is weighted by the number of individuals. Amemiya (1978)
shows that this two-step procedure is equivalent to one-step GLS. The fact that
the second stage is a simple time series regression makes it simple to allow for
serial correlation of residuals either by computing Newey-White standard errors or
by including lags of the unemployment rate. Both extensions lead to negligible
differences in the estimation results.
However, since the dependent variable is a proportion, the linear model can only be
regarded as an approximation. In a more structural approach, one would assume
that the qualification proportions within cells are generated by the aggregation of
individual decisions to the occupation level.12 The individual decisions (whether to
employ a high-skilled worker in a particular occupation) follow Bernoulli sampling,
which is why we estimate a grouped probit model with log-likelihood
lnL =
∑
o,t
not
{
sot lnΦ(xot β + γo) + (1− sot) ln
(
1− Φ(xot β + γo)
)}
(4)
where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal distribution function and not is the number
of employees per cell.
Some problems also remain with the grouped probit model. First, nonlinear fixed
effects models are inconsistent if the number of fixed effects increases proportion-
ally with the sample size and sufficient statistics for the other parameters of interest
are not available.13 This bias should be negligible in our estimation with 24 obser-
11 See Moulton (1986) for an exposition of the issue.
12 See Greene (2002) for a textbook introduction to proportions data models.
13 A sufficient statistic for the linear fixed effects model is the within-transformation because the
transformed model is purged of the fixed effects. Papke & Wooldridge (2008) present an alter-
native way incorporate fixed effects in fractional response models for panel data. They apply the
Chamberlain device which avoids estimation of all individual fixed effects application of a condi-
tional normality assumption for the fixed effects. The Chamberlain device is, however, valuable
or even necessary only for panels with short time dimension.
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vations (years) per occupation.
Second, the dependent variable is zero or one for some cells.14 This generates
surprisingly low standard errors in large samples and is a feature of the model.
An ad-hoc patch to this problem is to add or subtract a small number, say 0.001
from corner values of the dependent variable. Fortunately this problem disappears
when bootstrapped standard errors are used instead of asymptotic ones. Devereux
has to restrict his analysis to linear models because in his sample the dependent
variable is zero or one for a large number of cells – rendering the grouped probit
model infeasible.
As a further shortcoming the grouped model does not allow to include individual
level control variables (e.g. age, sex, establishment size). We checked this by
running linear index models with binary dependent variables15 and control vari-
ables age, sex and establishment size at the individual level. Since this has only
negligible effects on the unemployment coefficients, we apply the simpler grouped
models.
In the grouped probit model the marginal effect of the unemployment rate on skill
shares is
∂sot
∂u
= φ(xotβ) βu (5)
where φ(·) denotes the density of the standard normal distribution function and
βu the coefficient of the unemployment rate. The marginal effects depend on the
characteristics xot and all coefficients β and thus vary over occupation-year cells.
We compute the average marginal effect as
ME(x) ≡ ∂s
∂u
=
1
OT
∑
o
∑
t
φ(xotβ) βu (6)
where O and T denote the number of occupations and years. An alternative es-
timate often used in the literature (and implemented in the Stata® mfx command)
is
ME(x¯) ≡ ∂s
∂u
∣∣∣∣
x=x
= φ(x¯β) βu, (7)
i.e. the marginal effect evaluated at the average characteristics vector. ME(x) and
ME(x¯) are different because of the nonlinearity of φ(·). We consider the ME(x)
to be the adequate measure but report both.16
14 See Table 10 in the appendix.
15 The dependent variables are – in analogy to the definitions of proportions – (1) ‘the individual
has a college or technical college degree yes/no’ and (2) ‘at least a completed apprenticeship
yes/no’.
16 It is simple to construct examples where ME(x¯) gives meaningless results. Consider a simple
grouped probit model with only one regressor x and a positive correlation between x and the
dependent variable. If the sample contains only observations with very low and very large x
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The presence of the aggregated regressor Ut generates an additional problem for
the computation of standard errors. We apply a blocks bootstrap procedure to solve
it. Our bootstrap samples Sb consist of blocks containing all observations from
one year. The grouped probit model is computed for every bootstrap sample to
obtain ME(x) and ME(x¯). Inference is based on the vectors of bootstrap results
(ME(x)b=1, . . . ,ME(x)b=1000) and (ME(x¯)b=1, . . . ,ME(x¯)b=1000).
17
Inspection of the time series of fixed effects φˆt points to a structural break in
1998/1999 for the high-skilled shares. This break is likely to be caused by changes
of the reporting rules in 1999. To capture the break, a dummy for the years 1999-
2004 and interactions between the linear and squared trend with this dummy are
added to the model.
3.2 Results
Figure 1 gives a visual impression of the correlation between skill levels within
occupations and the unemployment rate over time. The proportions are coefficients
on year dummies obtained from the linear estimation of Equation 2. All series
are detrended to focus on the cyclical component.18 The positive correlation is
apparent for both the proportion of graduates and the proportion with vocational
degree or more.
Figure 1: Detrended skill proportions within occupations and the detrended unem-
ployment rate
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Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of Equations 3 and 4. The marginal ef-
fect of 0.109 for the proportion of graduates means that this proportion among new
values, then the marginal effects for both groups of observations are small because φ(·) is flat
for extreme values. Misleadingly the marginal effect evaluated at xˆ may be of considerable size
because φ(·) obtains its maximum in the center.
17 Stata’s® mfx command has a cluster option that allows for clustering of standard errors by year
(as required in our case). But the implementation is not applicable if the number of regressors
exceeds the number of clusters which is the case in our model with more than 300 fixed effects
but only 24 clusters (years).
18 To eliminate the trend we regress the original time series on linear and squared trends and plot
the residuals.
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hires increases by roughly 0.11 percentage points if the unemployment rate rises
by one percentage point. The corresponding value for the share of employees with
a vocational degree or more is 0.35 percentage points. All effects are significant
at the 5 percent confidence level. Note that ME(x¯), the marginal effect computed
at the average characteristics vector, is considerably lower for the regressions ex-
plaining graduate shares.19 As explained above, we consider ME(x) to be the
more meaningful measure. Note furthermore that ME(x) and marginal effects
from the linear model are quite similar, indicating that the linear model provides
good approximation.
Table 2: Marginal effects of the unemployment rate on skill proportions of new hires
Type of (1) (2)
marg. Proportion of Proportion with
effect graduates voc. degree or more
Marg. eff. SD Marg. eff. SD
Linear, 2-step 0.098 0.020 0.314 0.060
Grouped probit ME(x) 0.109 0.035 0.349 0.109
ME(x¯) 0.065 0.021 0.381 0.119
Notes: All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
The estimation sample contains 324×24 = 7776 occupation-year cells. ME(x) andME(x¯) denote
marginal effects as defined in Equations 6 and 7.
All regressions include linear and squared trend terms, a full set of fixed occupation effects, and
dummy and trend interaction terms for the period 1999-2004. Newey-West standard errors allowing
for serial correlation (up to 2 lags) are reported for the linear model. Standard errors for the grouped
probit model are computed using a block bootstrap procedure that allows for clustering by year.
Some cells are ‘censored’, see appendix Table 10.
Given the disclaimers regarding the comparability of the educational systems in
the U.S. and West Germany, a comparison of Devereux’s and our results reveals
unexpected similarities. He obtains a marginal effect of 0.16 (with standard er-
ror 0.07) for the proportion of graduates and 0.53 (with standard error 0.10) for
the proportion of employees with high school diploma or more. In both cases the
U.S. point estimates exceed our estimates for West Germany by about 50 percent
but the differences are statistically insignificant. These similarities are surprising if
we consider that the U.S. labour market is almost free of occupational regulations
whereas the German vocational training system is highly regulated.
A related hypothesis is that tight standardizations and regulations related to vo-
cational training lower the substitutability between skilled and unskilled jobs and
therefore are responsible for less pronounced responses in Germany. This can
19 The ME(x¯) is lower because the proportion of high-skilled in the estimation sample is about
7.6 percent, which implies that most observations fall in the lower (convex) part of the normal
distribution function. Thus ME(x¯) < ME(x) by Jensens’s inequality.
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be tested indirectly by restricting the estimation sample to occupations covered by
the dual vocational training system (recognized occupations, ‘anerkannte Ausbil-
dungsberufe’). The results in Table 3 show, however, that deviations from the base
sample are negligible and insignificant.
Table 3: Marginal effects of the unemployment rate on skill proportions of new
hires, restricted sample of (state-approved) recognized occupations
Type of (1) (2)
marg. Proportion of Proportion with
effect graduates voc. degree or more
Marg. eff. SD Marg. eff. SD
Linear, 2-step 0.109 0.016 0.318 0.055
Grouped probit ME(x) 0.090 0.021 0.369 0.107
ME(x¯) 0.043 0.010 0.409 0.119
Notes: All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
The estimation sample contains 184×24 = 4416 occupation-year cells. ME(x) andME(x¯) denote
marginal effects as defined in Equations 6 and 7. The register of recognized occupations contains
184 items, covering about 66 percent of the employees in our base sample. The specification is
identical to the model in Table 2.
As laid out Section 1, the theoretical model implies that skill proportions in occu-
pations with generally low skill requirements should react stronger to the business
cycle. To analyse this hypothesis with our data, we again follow Devereux (2002)
and distinguish occupations with different levels of skill requirements by grouping
the occupations according to their general wage level. The latter is calculated as
the median deflated wage per occupation over all years.20 We group the occu-
pations by median wage quintiles and run separate regressions for every quintile.
Marginal effects for the grouped probit are shown in Table 4.21 As expected, all
point estimates of the marginal effects are positive. They are significant at the
5 percent level for the lower four quintiles for graduates and for the three lower
quintiles for employees with at least a vocational degree.
Analogous to Devereux’s results, our findings do not indicate evidence of a system-
atic pattern for the graduates. The marginal effect for the 5th quintile is consider-
ably larger compared to the lower quintiles, but insignificant. For the proportion of
new hires with at least a vocational degree we find roughly equal marginal effects
for the first three quintiles and a decline for the 4th and 5th quintile. These results
are in line with our hypothesis and similar to Devereux’s results. In contrast to our
results his estimates decline more evenly from 0.1 (0.14) in the 1st quintile to -0.21
20 We use the median instead of the average wage because of right censoring. The median is
below the censoring limit for all occupations.
21 The linear model and the ME(x¯) of the grouped probit yield very similar results that are shown
in Table 11 in the Appendix.
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Table 4: Marginal effects of the unemployment rate on skill proportions of new hires
by quintiles, grouped probit, ME(x)
Proportion of Proportion with
graduates voc. degree or more
Marg. eff. SD Marg. eff. SD
1st quintile 0.066 0.015 0.444 0.138
2nd quintile 0.045 0.010 0.469 0.151
3rd quintile 0.072 0.018 0.456 0.166
4th quintile 0.070 0.031 0.232 0.165
5th quintile 0.234 0.130 0.058 0.053
Notes: All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
ME(x) denotes the sample average of marginal the effects as defined in Equation 6.
(0.07) in the 5th quintile. Regarding the hypothesis that the effect of the business
cycle on hiring standards should be larger for occupations with generally low skill
requirements we find similar evidence for West Germany as Devereux found for
the U.S.: high-skilled proportions are equally affected across occupation types but
medium-or-more skilled proportions are more reactive in low wage occupations.
Table 5: Marginal effects of the unemployment rate on skill proportions of new hires
by establishment size, grouped probit, ME(x)
Estab. Size Proportion of Proportion with
graduates voc. degree or more
Marg. eff. SD Marg. eff. SD
1-19 0.088 0.018 0.296 0.097
20-99 0.123 0.026 0.394 0.098
≥ 100 0.159 0.050 0.321 0.172
Notes: All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
ME(x) denotes the sample average of marginal the effects as defined in Equation 6. See Table 10
in the appendix for shares of corner solutions (skill proportion is zero or one).
A possible explanation for the lower responses of the occupational skill composition
in Germany may be found by separating the effects by establishment size. Table 5
shows marginal effects for small, medium size and large establishments. The re-
sponses are more pronounced for medium size and large establishments. Several
reasons might explain these differences. First, large establishments have alterna-
tive jobs for unskilled workers if it turns out that the hired person does not meet the
requirements of the particular job he was hired for. Second, helpers and handy-
men can be utilized better in larger teams because in teams they can specialize on
certain tasks.22
22 Note however, that small firms are exempted from job protection laws in Germany. This lowers
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Devereux’s analysis does not differentiate by establishment size. Thus we do not
know whether the impact of establishment size on the response of skill proportions
in the U.S. is similar to Germany. In this case establishment size could explain
part of the differences between the U.S. and Germany. Table 6 shows that Ger-
many has considerably more small (1-4 employees) and less large (more than 500)
establishments than the U.S.
Table 6: Comparison of establishment size distributions in 1990
Country 0-4∗ 5-9 10-19 20-99 100-499 500+
Germany 63.26 17.56 9.32 7.87 1.69 0.30
U.S. 49.10 15.72 9.71 9.56 4.13 11.78
Note: ∗ U.S.: 0-4 employees (establishments with 0 employees have no paid employees in the
mid-March pay period, but at least one in some other period of the year), Germany: 1-4 employees
liable to social security.
Source: U.S.: U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns, Germany: Employment Register
(BEH), reference date June 30, 1990.
4 Explaining occupational composition wages
In this section we isolate the component of the cyclical variation of wages that is
due to occupational up- and downgrading. We answer the question “how would
aggregate wages respond to the business cycle if wages remained constant within
all occupations?” In this case all wage variation is caused purely by changes of
the occupational employment structure (composition). Note that this question is
complementary to the empirical literature on the cyclicality of wages which puts
focus on gross wage changes.23 To avoid misunderstandings we introduce a new
label for this measure: occupational composition wage.
4.1 Empirical model
As in the preceding sections, our analysis follows Devereux (2002). To investi-
gate the cyclicality of the occupational composition wage he runs regressions of
the change of an indicator for occupational quality on demographic control vari-
ables (dummies for black, married, white, graduate, high school, a cubic polyno-
mial in experience), a time trend and the change of the national unemployment
rate. The dependent variable is constructed as follows. First, compute mean
the risk associated with hiring unskilled workers. Apparently, these exemptions do not play a
significant role. See Bauer, Bender, & Bonin (2007) for a systematic investigation of the issue.
23 ‘Composition bias’ is a central issue in this literature. These studies investigate, however, the
composition of the labour force with respect to employed and unemployed workers but not the
occupational structure of the employed. See Abraham & Haltiwanger (1995) for a survey.
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wages for every occupation zo := (1/no)
∑
t
∑
iD(i, o, t) ln(wit) where the dummy
D(i, o, t) is one if individual i works in occupation o in year t (and zero other-
wise) and no =
∑
i
∑
tD(i, o, t). The dependent variable of the regression is
computed as change of the occupation wage induced by a change of occupation,
i.e. ∆ziot = zo′ − zo if individual i moves from occupation o to o′ in year t and zero
if i remains in the same occupation. This implies that the wage gain (or loss) of
a worker switching between occpuations o and o′ is equal to the (long term) mean
wage difference between these occupations. The estimation model has the form
∆ziot = α1 + α2∆Ut + α3 xiot + α4 t+ vt + ²iot (8)
Here Ut denotes the unemployment rate, xoit contains individual level control vari-
ables for individual i, t is the time trend, vt is a time shock and ²iot a white noise
residual.
Specification (8) is similar to the one used frequently in the wage cyclicality lit-
erature24 but inconsistent with the standard Phillips curve specification where the
change of the unemployment rate enters instead of the level. A simple way to test
between these two specifications (proposed by Card & Hyslop (1997)) is to replace
∆Ut in the regression above by α02Ut+α
1
2Ut−1. Then the H0 related to the Phillips-
Curve is HP0 : α
1
2 = 0 whereas H
C
0 : α
1
2 = −α02 is compatible with the standard
cyclicality formulation. Application of the test to our data delivers moderate though
not fully conclusive evidence in favour of the standard wage cyclicality formulation.
The estimates for α02 and α
1
2 (and standard errors in brackets) are -0.397 (0.062)
and 0.290 (0.052) for men and -0.679 (0.066) and 0.363 (0.052) for women, re-
spectively. Although the coefficients of the lagged unemployment rate are highly
significant and thus clearly reject HP0 , the difference between α
0
2 and α
1
2 is large
enough to reject HC0 , too. We proceed with the difference specification for two
reasons. First, we regard the estimates as being more in line with HC0 . And sec-
ond, the estimation of a dynamic model would add several technical problems but
should deliver similar results for our purposes.25
In order to calculate wage differences we restrict the estimation sample to all job
movers who were employed in the current year and the year before for at least two
months. As in the previous section, Devereux implements the estimation in two
stages. In the first stage, changes of occupational mean wages are regressed on
24 See Abraham & Haltiwanger (1995) for an overview and references.
25 As is well known, standard fixed effects models are biased due to correlation of the lagged
endogenous variable with the error term. Alternative GMM estimators require good instruments
and appeared to be unstable in empirical applications. If the dynamics is not relevant per se, the
difference model provides a good approximation to short run effects which are in our focus, see
e.g. Baltagi & Griffin (1984).
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individual characteristics and a full set of year dummies.
∆ziot = α1 + α3 xiot +
T∑
t=1
φtDt + ²iot (9)
The coefficients of the year dummies can be interpreted as occupational compo-
sition effects by year. In the second stage they are regressed (using cell size as
weight) on a linear time trend and the change of the unemployment rate.26
φˆt = α2∆Ut + α4 t+ ²ot (10)
The two-stage approach is computationally convenient to obtain unbiased standard
errors in the presence of the aggregated regressor but not necessary. Alternatively,
one can estimate in one step and cluster standard errors by year. We experimented
with both approaches because the two-stage approach is slightly more flexible,27
but report only the one-step results because the differences in results are small.
Our specifications differs in two aspects from Devereux’s model. First, we use
a slightly different set of control variables. We do not include a dummy for mar-
riage because this information is not contained in our data. Variations of the set
of individual level control variables, however, seem to have a small impact on the
results. The second and more important difference to Devereux is, that in our data
about 10 percent of the wages are right censored. Before we calculate the average
wages for each occupation, we replace these censored wages with predictions of
the unobserved wages.28
Reder’s theory predicts that the extent of occupational upgrading should vary over
the wage distribution. If high wage occupations respond to increasing product de-
mand by poaching workers from lower paying occupations, then in the lower paying
occupations also the slots of the poached workers have to be filled. Therefore the
possibilities (measured as vacancies) to move to better-paying occupations should
be higher for employees with low wages and skills. To test this, Devereux sorts
workers into quintile groups using a simple measure of personal skills. The mea-
sure is the predicted wage from a regression of (log) wages on personal charac-
teristics.29 We created two slightly different skill measures. The first one is the
predicted wage from a regression including a cubic in experience, education dum-
26 The linear trend is used instead of a quadratic because the model is formulated in first differ-
ences.
27 It allows to account for serial correlation in the computation of standard errors in a simple form.
28 First we run tobit regressions of individual log wages on control variables (the same as in the
final regressions) and year dummies separately for every occupation and sex. Then we predict
censored wages and add residuals drawn from a truncated normal distribution with the standard
deviation estimated by the tobit models. Finally means of the imputed wages are computed for
every occupation.
29 Devereux uses education indicators, a cubic in experience, race dummies and a marriage indi-
cator.
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mies, and a set of year dummies (but year dummies do not enter the prediction).
For the second measure, job characteristics such as a second order polynomial
in log establishment size, a dummy for white collar workers and 27 sector dum-
mies are added to the first specification, but as the year dummies these are not
used for the prediction. The second specification should deliver a more precise
estimate of personal productivity since correlations with establishment or sector
level variables are eliminated. The difference between both specifications is small
with respect to the second step estimates. In the next section we show the results
based on the second measure which is more conservative (i.e. it produces slightly
less pronounced differences between quintile groups).
4.2 Results
The occupational composition wage depends on the mean occupation wages and
the occupational composition of employment. As the mean occupation wages are
by construction constant over time, the business cycle must create employment
shifts between occupations to exert an impact on the occupational composition
wage. Thus we start our investigation with a descriptive analysis of whether and to
what extent occupation changes are induced by the business cycle.
Figure 2: Occupation changes of new hires versus unemployment rate
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Table 7 shows that up- and downgrading are about as common in general but oc-
curs more often for men. As expected, the numbers for the U.S. indicate a greater
flexibility. Devereux finds a much higher share of occupation changers, only 26
percent remain in the same occupation. The relation between up- and downgrad-
ing and the business cycle can be shown graphically. We partition the sample of
job changers into workers who move to better paid occupations (upgrade), lower
paid occupations (downgrade) and workers who stay in the same occupation (no
change). The shares of these groups are plotted against the unemployment rate
in Figure 2. It is clear at a glance that the shares of upgraders and downgraders
are procyclical whereas the share of stayers is countercyclical. This visual impres-
sion is confirmed by regressions of the change of these shares on a constant,
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Table 7: Shares of up- and downgraders in Germany and the U.S.
Men Women
Occ. wage Up Down Const. Up Down Const.
Germany 22 24 55 17 22 62
U.S. 38 36 26 - - -
Notes: Upgrades (downgrades) are establishment changes associated with an occupation wage
increase (decrease), const. stands for employees who change the establishment but not the occu-
pation.
Source: U.S. numbers are taken from Devereux (2002), p. 438., values for Germany are based on
our establishment mover sample.
a linear trend and the change of the unemployment rate. This yields the coeffi-
cients (standard errors in brackets) -0.018 (0.004) for upgraders, -0.007 (0.002)
for downgraders, and 0.025 (0.005) for stayers.30 Note that upturns also increase
the share of downgraders. But the effect is less pronounced than the effect on
upgrades. In Figure 3 we give a visual impression of the correlation between the
Figure 3: Changes of the unemployment rate and aggregate wage changes due to
changes of the occupational employment structure
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occupational composition wage and unemployment. It plots the coefficients of year
dummies from the first step regression against the change of the unemployment
rate. By construction, these coefficients represent the pure occupational compo-
sition effect. It is clear from the figure that rising unemployment coincides with
falling occupational composition wages and that this correlation is strong for men
and women.
Table 8 contains the estimation results for several specifications of the model. Note
that the large sample for the proportions models in Section 1 was necessary to
avoid proportions of zero and one. As this problem does not arise here, the wage
analysis in this section is based on a 25 percent random sample to reduce the
30 Adding a squared trend term to the regression does not change the results.
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Table 8: Effect of unemployment rate changes on occupational composition wage
changes.
Men Women
Sample (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Change of -0.342 -0.096 -0.255 -0.512 -0.091 -0.303
unempl. rate 0.063 0.034 0.045 0.124 0.048 0.093
Experience -0.000 0.042 0.028 -0.238 0.004 -0.072
0.019 0.012 0.017 0.026 0.015 0.014
Experience2/100 -0.529 -0.538 -0.544 0.866 -0.108 0.168
0.104 0.070 0.094 0.117 0.080 0.072
Experience3/1000 0.099 0.090 0.094 -0.124 0.014 -0.024
0.016 0.011 0.015 0.018 0.012 0.012
WHITE COLLAR 2.717 1.805 2.354 1.756 1.270 2.173
0.108 0.082 0.092 0.172 0.032 0.056
MEDIUM QUAL. 0.160 0.355 0.296 -1.555 -0.360 -1.218
0.051 0.032 0.047 0.097 0.052 0.093
HIGH QUAL. -0.149 0.081 0.339 -0.068 1.160 0.588
0.104 0.078 0.111 0.202 0.144 0.221
MISSING QUAL. 0.117 0.371 0.213 -1.300 -0.103 -0.572
0.037 0.059 0.052 0.132 0.074 0.096
Trend -0.019 -0.011 -0.015 -0.045 -0.004 -0.032
0.011 0.005 0.009 0.018 0.007 0.014
Constant 2.665 1.231 1.864 7.611 0.525 4.211
0.993 0.519 0.822 1.655 0.626 1.335
Observations 5035738 2323853 5035738 2268876 1131037 2268876
Notes: All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
Robust standard errors that allow for clustering by year are given below coefficients.
Results are based on a 25 percent random sample of persons from the full sample of all job movers.
Legend: (1) base sample including all individuals who changed jobs, (2) workers remaining in the
same sector only, (3) workers remaining in establishments of similar size only. The construction of
the samples (2) and (3) is detailed in the appendix.
dummy variables are printed in uppercase letters.
Samples (2) and (3) relate to the shorter period 1985-2002 because of an incompatible change of
the industry classification in 2002/2003.
computational burden. To start with consider column (1) relating to the base sam-
ple (all establishment movers). By definition of the dependent variable and other
regressors, the constant gives the average percent change of the occupational
composition wage for unskilled blue collar workers with zero years of experience
for the estimation period 1985-2002. It amounts to about 2.7 percent for men and
7.6 percent for women. This implies that there is (on average) a net flow from lower
to higher paid occupations. The negative trend coefficient shows that this effect
has diminished slightly. The big difference between men an women may be ex-
plained by the important role of maternity leave for young women, who apparently
restart their carrier after maternity leave spells in low paid jobs and advance in the
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sequel.31 Furthermore the average upgrading effect is significantly higher for em-
ployees with completed apprenticeship but lower for college and technical college
graduates. The first effect may be explained by the fact that vocational training has
an important signalling function in Germany but apprenticeship training positions
are scarce especially in the well paid occupations. Apparently labour market en-
trants respond to this by using apprenticeship training in less attractive occupations
as vouchers to the more attractive ones. At a glance, the coefficient of the white
collar dummy appears huge. Note, however, that this dummy is (in contrast to the
other dummies) time-variable. Thus it seems to reflect promotions that go along
with the occupation change.32
Regarding the main objective of the study, we find highly significant but rather small
effects of the business cycle on occupational upgrading. A one percent decrease
of the (national) unemployment produces a 0.34 and 0.51 percent increase of the
occupational composition wage for men and women, respectively. These effects
are considerably smaller than Devereux’s results for the U.S. (-0.91 percent for
men and -1.04 percent for women).
Our focus on occupations (as units defining homogenous skill requirements) ap-
pears sensible for this application. Nevertheless it is off the beaten track of the
empirical literature which concentrates on industry wage differences. Since occu-
pations are not evenly distributed over industries, and our model does not account
for transitions between industries, the unemployment coefficients may capture sec-
toral upgrading effects. A further competing explanation for wage upgrading refers
firm size wage differentials. Large firms which pay rents to their employees may
exploit this in upturns to poach workers from smaller firms. A simple way to check
the relevance of both issues is to restrict the estimation sample to new hires who
remain in the same two digit industry (see columns with header (2) in Table 8)33
or the same establishment size group (see columns with header (3)). The def-
inition of the establishment size change indicator is described in the appendix.
To make the industry and establishment size change indicators comparable, they
were constructed such that they produce similar shares of movers: According to
our definition, 52 percent the new hires in sample (1) change establishment size
and 48 percent change the two-digit industry code. From columns (2) and (3) it
is evident at a glance that sectoral upgrading explains the lion’s share of cyclical
31 Note that our sample contains only job-to-job movers, i.e. employees who had a job at the
reference date of the previous year. Since maternity leave spells last longer than one year in
most cases, its downgrade effect (women worked in a better paid occupation before the maternity
leave period than afterwards) is not included in our analysis.
32 Typical examples are promotions of production workers to executive postions.
33 We use a classification containing 28 groups. Because the industry classification changes in an
incompatible form in 2002, we are urged to restrict the samples (2) to the period 1985-2002. To
check whether the period change has an impact on our results in columns (1), we reran these
regressions for the period 1985-2002 but found only negligible differences.
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occupational upgrading: The coefficients for sample (2) of new hires who stay in
the same industry are much lower in absolute value, whereas sample (3) of new
hires who stay in the same establishment size class shows negligible differences to
sample (1). Note that the lower unemployment coefficient for sample (2) does not
invalidate the role of occupations for wage upgrading. It only tells us that a good
deal of occupational composition wage effects are intrinsically related to industry
changes.
Devereux points to the problem that observed wages may not indicate the desirabil-
ity of an occupation if compensating differentials play an important role or if wage
differentials are noncompetitive. In the case of compensating differentials, higher
occupation wages reflect higher risks or worse working conditions but not more pro-
ductive or better skilled employees. In the case of a noncompetitive wage setting,
e.g. efficiency wage problems may foster the transformation of small (or unob-
served) productivity or skill differences into large wage markups. To check for that,
Devereux replaces the dependent variable (observed occupation wages) by ‘oc-
cupation skill’ wages. Occupation skill wages are obtained by replacing individual
observed wages with predicted wages in the definition of the occupational wage,
i.e. z˜o := (1/no)
∑
t
∑
iD(i, o, t) ln(wˆit), where wˆit is the predicted wage from an
auxiliary regression.34 The occupation skill wage should be free of noncompeti-
tive wage markups and components compensating for extra risk or bad working
conditions. If the occupational composition wage effects found above are mainly
due to compensation or noncompetitive wage differentials, they should vanish after
replacing occupational wages by occupational skill wages. In our application, this
replacement shrinks the sample (1) coefficients (in absolute value) from -0.342 to
-0.045 for men and from -0.512 to -0.216 for women. For men the coefficient be-
comes insignificant (standard errors are 0.034 for men and 0.029 for women). This
indicates that noncompetitive or compensating wage differentials are important de-
terminants of the occupational composition wage effect. When Devereux replaces
observed by occupation skill wages for the U.S. data, his estimates shrink from
-0.91 to -0.37 for men and from -1.04 to -0.34 for women but remain significant at
the five percent level. Thus, the relevance of compensating and noncompetitive
wage differentials is similar in both countries.
Under a Reder competition regime, high wage occupations absorb employees from
lower paid occupations during upturns. This generates additional demand in the
lower paid occupations which in turn should increase the wage upgrading effect
for employees in the lower part of the skill distribution. We test this by sorting all
34 Individual wages are regressed on personal characteristics and control variables. Personal char-
acteristics are the education dummies and a cubic polynomial in (potential) experience. Control
variables are year dummies, 27 sector dummies, a white collar dummy and a second order poly-
nomial in log establishment size. Note that only personal characteristics enter the prediction.
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Table 9: Effect of unemployment rate changes on occupation wage changes, by
quintiles
Men Women
Sample (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1st quintile -0.490 -0.187 -0.347 -0.828 -0.169 -0.452
0.085 0.045 0.064 0.259 0.094 0.201
2nd quintile -0.426 -0.108 -0.314 -0.589 -0.106 -0.344
0.094 0.049 0.072 0.155 0.077 0.123
3rd quintile -0.306 -0.081 -0.206 -0.593 -0.193 -0.425
0.079 0.040 0.049 0.100 0.033 0.052
4th quintile -0.277 -0.116 -0.216 -0.223 -0.006 -0.061
0.052 0.048 0.056 0.114 0.044 0.077
5th quintile -0.160 -0.031 -0.124 -0.348 -0.007 -0.215
0.045 0.037 0.041 0.115 0.051 0.102
Notes: All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
Robust standard errors that allow for clustering by year are given below coefficients.
Results are based on a 25 percent random sample of persons from the full sample of all job movers.
Legend: (1) base sample including all individuals who changed jobs, (2) workers remaining in the
same sector only, (3) workers remaining in establishments of similar size only. The construction of
the samples (2) and (3) is detailed in the appendix.
dummy variables are printed in uppercase letters.
Samples (2) and (3) relate to the shorter period 1985-2002 because of an incompatible change of
the industry classification in 2002/2003.
new hires in five quintile groups using predicted wages from an auxiliary regression
of wages on personal characteristics and control variables (see footnote 34). The
resulting unemployment change coefficients are listed in Table 9. To start with,
consider columns with header (1). Here the first quintile response for men (-0.49
percent) exceeds the fifth quintile response (-0.16 percent) by a factor of about
three. The relation is similar for women although the levels are higher. Furthermore,
the differences between the first three and the fifth quintile are significant at the
five percent confidence level for men as well as women.35 The comparison with
Devereux’s results again reveals similar structures between the U.S. and Germany.
For the men sample he obtains an effect of -2.22 percent (with se. 0.66) for the
first and 0.37 percent (with se. 0.53) for the fifth quintile. Corresponding results for
women are -0.97 (with se. 0.26) for the first and 0.62 (with se. 0.27) for the fifth
quintile.
As in the section above, columns relating to the employees remaining in the same
two-digit industry (2) and the ones remaining in the same establishment size class
(3) suggest that industry changes play an important role for the business-cycle
35 P-values of the tests are PV (H0 : b1 = b5) = 0.000, PV (H0 : b2 = b5) = 0.011 and PV (H0 :
b3 = b5) = 0.028 for men and PV (H0 : b1 = b5) = 0.035, PV (H0 : b2 = b5) = 0.076 and
PV (H0 : b3 = b5) = 0.032 for women.
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component of occupational composition wages. Although wage effects become
smaller for all quintiles, the ranking of the effects by quintile remains the same.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the responsiveness of the occupational skill structure and
occupational composition wages to the business cycle and compare the estimates
with corresponding results from a study using U.S. data (Devereux (2002)). This
comparison is particularly interesting because of striking differences between U.S.
and German labour market institutions. Whereas the German labour market is
characterized by a highly regulated and standardized vocational training system
and a canonical structure of occupations, a standardized vocational training system
with approved examinations does not exist in the U.S., the occupational structure
is less formalized and occupational mobility is much higher than in Germany.
Our estimates show that within occupations the skill level of new hires rises sig-
nificantly in recessions and decreases in upturns. The effects for West Germany
amount to about 70 percent of the corresponding U.S. results. They are, however,
larger than expected given the striking institutional differences mentioned above.
Separate estimation of the model by establishment size groups suggests that ef-
fects are lower for small establishments, implying that a good deal of the difference
between both countries may already be explained by a greater share of small estab-
lishments in Germany. Further differentiation of the sample into low and high wage
occupations reveals that the share of unskilled is affected stronger in low wage
occupations than in high wage occupations whereas no clear pattern can be found
for the high-skilled. Several checks show that the results are robust to changes of
the occupational classification level, the choice of the estimation model, and the
time period considered.
Our results regarding occupational composition wages also indicate a lower re-
sponsiveness to the business cycle than in the U.S. The estimates amount to about
30 and 40 percent of their U.S. counterparts for men and women, respectively. We
should, however, be cautious to interpret this as a clear indication for more im-
portant wage rigidities in Germany. Responses of the occupational composition
wage to the business cycle are based on two components. First, more higher pay-
ing occupations can attract workers during upswings only if there exist noteworthy
noncompetitive wage differentials. And second, the occupational system must be
flexible enough to allow employees to switch between occupations. Effectiveness
of the first component (noncompetitive wage differentials) requires rigidities, the
second flexibility. Thus lower responsiveness of the German occupational compo-
sition wage may be either due to less pronounced noncompetitive wage differen-
tials or due to a less permeable occupational system. U.S. transition probabilities
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between occupations approximately double their German counterparts. If these
numbers are based on roughly comparable data, they already explain the lion’s
share between U.S. and German responses of the occupational composition wage
to unemployment. Consequently, noncompetitive wage differentials do not appear
to be much more pronounced in Germany. Finally, we should be keep in mind
that greater occupational mobility in the U.S. does not necessarily imply efficiency.
It comes at the cost of lower occupation-specific human capital which is likely to
enhance productivity but this is out of regard in this analysis.
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A Appendix
Definition of establishment size changes
It is impossible to provide a fully consistent and theoretically meaningful definition of
establishment size changes for movers. An establishment size change from 1000
to 1001 is a change, but it is economically not meaningful. In order to include mean-
ingful changes only, our definition uses relative changes combined with thresholds
depending on establishment size. Furthermore it is constructed to yield a number
of establishment size changes that is similar to the number of two-digit industry
changes. With our definition, 52 percent of the new hires change establishment
size and 48 percent change two-digit industry. The establishment size change in-
dicator used to define the sample in columns (3) of Tables 8 and 9 is constructed as
follows: First we define five establishment size groups for 1-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-
199 and 200+ employees. Then establishment size change Indicator It depends
on the mean e¯t := (et + et−1)/2 of the previous and the current year’s establish-
ment size and the absolute value of the log difference gt := | ln(et) − ln(et−1)| in
the following way:
if 20 ≤ e¯t < 50, then It := 1(gt > 1.5), if 50 ≤ e¯t < 100, then It := 1(gt > 1) if
100 ≤ e¯t < 200, then It := 1(gt > 0.8) if e¯t ≥ 200, then It := 1(gt > 0.6). Here 1(·)
denotes the boolean indicator function evaluating to one if its argument is true and
zero otherwise.
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Table 10: Number of cells with skill shares of zero or one
Value Frequency Share
Unweighted Weighted
Full sample
Graduates 0 408 0.052 0.004
1 0 0.000 0.000
Vocational degree or more 0 0 0.000 0.000
1 12 0.002 0.000
Small establishments (1-4 employees)
Graduates 0 1399 0.180 0.016
1 0 0.000 0.000
Vocational degree or more 0 5 0.006 0.000
1 0 0.000 0.002
Medium size establishments (5-99 employees)
Graduates 0 1708 0.220 0.032
1 0 0.000 0.000
Vocational degree or more 0 5 0.000 0.000
1 51 0.007 0.000
Large establishments (≥ 100 employees)
Graduates 0 1342 0.173 0.018
1 3 0.000 0.000
Vocational degree or more 0 12 0.002 0.000
1 54 0.007 0.002
The full estimation sample contains 7776 cells. The small, medium and large establishment size
samples contain 7776, 7765 and 7768 cells, respectively. The last column is calculated by weighting
each cell with the respective number of employees.
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Table 11: Marginal effects of the unemployment rate on skill proportions of new
hires by quintiles, alternative estimations
Proportion of Proportion with voc.
graduates degree or more
Marg. eff. SD Marg. eff. SD
Linear model, 2-step
1st quintile 0.030 0.003 0.405 0.084
2nd quintile 0.027 0.004 0.480 0.094
3rd quintile 0.116 0.016 0.343 0.072
4th quintile 0.045 0.015 0.243 0.095
5th quintile 0.224 0.073 0.072 0.025
Grouped probit, marg. eff. evaluated at sample averages (ME(x¯))
1st quintile 0.036 0.008 0.538 0.166
2nd quintile 0.030 0.007 0.540 0.174
3rd quintile 0.034 0.009 0.518 0.188
4th quintile 0.033 0.015 0.235 0.168
5th quintile 0.343 0.191 0.042 0.038
Note: All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
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